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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THUCYDIDES AND THE SOUL OF VICTORY: 
OLYMPIC POLITICS IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 
BERNARD J. DOB SKI, JR. 
Thucydides comes down to us as the author of an account of the life and 
death of Greek politics known traditionally as the History. 1 Because Thucydides 
is widely considered a historian and not a philosopher, we do not think in the 
first place to study him when we ask whether Socrates and the political 
philosophy to which he gave birth form the roots of European identity. Indeed, 
in the only work Thucydides leaves us, one encounters no philosopher and the 
word "philosophy" is used only once (II.40. l ). And to our knowledge 
Thucydides never spent any time with Socrates or his students. 
But Thucydides' relevance to a Europe whose political identity has 
increasingly come into question becomes clear when we reflect on the 
justification of his great theme. The greatness of his work flows from the 
character of the Hellenic civilization that the Peloponnesian war destroyed and 
of which it was the peak. One may therefore understand Thucydides as the first 
to account for and evaluate the origins of that civilization. For Thucydides, what 
makes Greek civilization unique derives from the Greeks' discovery of politics, 
understood as the emergence of and respect for the common good. If the ideal 
embodied in Greek politics forms one of the pillars of European identity, then 
turning to Thucydides should offer a useful corrective for a Europe that flirts 
with the ideological temptation to, as one commentator suggests, abandon its 
identity and be done with politics.2 To be specific, Thucydides' work reminds 
contemporary Europeans who seek to transcend their national boundaries of the 
civilizing and moderating effects of political communities devoted to common, 
and thus exclusive and particular, goods. The History thus provides a cautionary 
tale for all those tempted by immoderate and utopian desires to abandon such 
exclusive and particular communities. 
But what does this have to do with Socrates? When we reflect on the 
traditional classification of Thucydides as a historian we discover that this label 
rests partly on an anachronism; his work precedes the emergence and hardening 
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of the divisions between the sciences, themselves originating much later in the 
work of Aristotle. And in claiming to present the enduring truths regarding the 
nature of man and of politics through an account of a single event, Thucydides 
comes to sight as neither historian nor philosopher nor poet, as Aristotle 
understood them, but some combination of all three. Indeed, the very form and 
content of the History force us to question the rigidity of such distinctions and 
the epistemological assumptions they embody. His claims to universal insight 
coupled with his unremitting focus on practical politics and his conscious 
refusal to indulge in any explicit theorizing suggest that Thucydides discovered 
a "new" method of presenting political wisdom, one seemingly opposite that 
employed by the Platonic and Xenophontic "Socrates." His work thus invites us 
to question anew the approach traditionally associated with political philosophy. 
In Thucydides' presentation of the life and death of Greek politics we find his 
contemporary relevance to Europe and his contribution to classical Greek 
rationalism delicately interwoven. This paper intends to provide an account of 
that interweaving. 
The commentary on Thucydides' text that follows intends to show that 
Thucydides, in revealing the distinctive character of Greek politics as he does, 
also indicates the conditions necessary for reflecting on the nature of Greek 
political life. By exposing the nature of Greek politics, he points out the limits 
facing the common good and thus points to the limit to our capacity to know a 
political good that is wholly common. In seeking to abandon a Europe des 
patries, contemporary Europeans not only flirt with dangerous utopian visions; 
they also risk obscuring our sense of the limits to reason and thus obstructing 
the wisdom that reflects our acceptance of them. 
The Olympic Character of Greek Politics 
To grasp the import of the Greek ideal to Thucydides (and to European 
politics), we must begin with his account of the birth of Greek politics. And that 
means we must turn to his first comments on Greek politics and Olympic 
contests as he presents them together at the very opening of his narrative 
account (1.6). In turning to Thucydides' narrative, however, one must exercise 
care. His account of the ancient past, like all his narrative, is unusually 
compressed, forcing its readers to tease out those insights that govern its 
composition. To appreciate the narrative's political wisdom, the reader must 
supply on his own the reflections that inform and unite the seemingly offhand 
details dotting Thucydides' prose. And the reader can only do this if he works 
backwards, as it were, reconstructing Thucydides' political wisdom from the 
details that he selected for his narrative. By approaching the archaeology in this 
way, we can best discover what makes Greek politics so distinctive. 
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Thucydides remarks that it was in Sparta first where the great among the 
citizens chose to observe an equality of appearance (isodiaitoi) among the many, 
adopting the more modest style of dress worn by the poor. A sense of restraint 
on one's outward conduct on behalf of the welfare of others originated in 
Sparta. He then notes that the Spartans also originated the Olympic practice of 
wrestling in the nude. By having one follow the other Thucydides invites us to 
uncover how one of his seemingly irrelevant asides bears on one of his most 
explicit and most important political notes. 3 
According to the narrative, those who dominate in politics freely choose to 
conceal outward appearances of their superiority. Those who aspire to dominate 
physically, on the other hand, choose to reveal themselves when competing. By 
discarding their clothes, the Spartan wrestlers discard conventional covers and 
restraints, staking out a kind of non-conventional, or natural, self-sufficiency. 
Because such a self-disclosure aims at revealing one's natural greatness and 
beauty, then it cannot be understood as simply a means to the victor's garland; 
indeed, the very act of disrobing testifies to one's superiority insofar as it 
requires one to overcome the shame of one's nakedness. The concern for how 
one competes (clothed or unclothed) thus mediates the concern for victory and 
its spoils. The contest's outcome is now understood to confirm about the 
contestants what the audience should see with their "own two eyes." Exercising 
naked amounts to a claim to the goods of victory in light of one's nature. On the 
basis of this innovation, Thucydides draws his first distinction between the 
Greeks, who fight in the nude, and the Asiatic barbarians, who cover their 
bodies in the pursuit of victory's rewards. 
To reconcile the Spartan practice of self disclosure with the Spartan politics 
of concealment, we must recall that in the on-going contest to preserve their 
rule, the Spartan great voluntarily limit the open exercise of their power by 
concealing the appearance of their greatness. Like the grapplers, they eschew 
the concern for the material goods that follow from rule in favor of 
considerations regarding how they rule. And like the Olympic combatants, they 
aim to establish their superiority in terms of self-sufficiency. For who else, but 
the supremely self-sufficient, could afford to forego the possession of those 
goods that rule affords? Moreover, by donning the garb of the commoners they 
refrain from gaudy displays of wealth. The pride of the demos, and thus the 
stability of the community, serves to check their pursuit of individual self-
interest. Thus devotion to the community's welfare, understood as the disclosure 
of one's superior character, seems to be both a means to legitimate rule and an 
essential part of the rule itself. 
By crediting the Greeks with generating the concern for "the common," 
Thucydides credits them with discovering politics itself. And by crediting the 
Greeks with the discovery of politics, he credits them with revealing more 
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clearly than before the human origin of the sense of a rightful limit on self-
interest. Such an interpretation is, of course, by no means obvious, but what 
Thucydides tells us about the earliest Athenians, in a note just prior to this 
section, lends it support. 
Forced to farm Attica's poor soil and dogged by the constant threat of 
starvation, the early Athenians naturally possessed a heightened awareness of 
their vulnerability and exposure to need. The experience of such constant need 
seems to have impressed upon them the fact that no amount of goods could ever 
free them from the threat of evils. This awareness was reinforced, paradoxically, 
by the fact that some of those who originally settled the city were no weaklings 
themselves. They too originally possessed power, but not enough power (they 
were dunatotatoi, I.2.6). The depth of the Athenians's concern for self-
sufficiency finds perhaps no more artful expression than in the note that later 
generations, growing into a more luxurious way of life, discarded the 
convention of wearing golden-grasshoppers in their hair (I.6.3), a convention 
intended to honor the city's autochthonous gods. 4 
By reminding them of their autochthonous gods, such adornments recall 
their attachment to and dependence on this particular land, as infertile and 
unforgiving as Attica is. By abandoning this convention as they freed 
themselves from poverty, the wealthy Athenians revealed their yearning to be 
free of their bond to this particular land and the physical neediness that that 
bond signified. Their actions testify to their desire to break free from the limits 
imposed by both nature and the gods. Their impiety points to their desire for a 
complete and total freedom, and thus a self-sufficiency, that is entirely the 
product of one's own efforts. Owing itself to no one or no thing outside of one's 
self, such freedom appears, quite naturally, limitless. Desires for such freedom 
and self-sufficiency, however, seem to be at odds with the earliest Athenians's 
initial experiences with both nature and politics. The encounter with an 
inhospitable nature combined with their political failures seems to have made 
these Athenians keenly aware both that they require external goods to satisfy the 
needs which plague them and that they can never have enough power to acquire 
all the goods necessary to satisfy such needs. In this light, the endless pursuit of 
unlimited power surely appears absurd. 
Awareness of this predicament, however, seems perfectly consistent with 
both the Spartan efforts at disclosure and concealment. By voluntarily 
eschewing the possession of external goods, the Spartan elite, for example, 
could establish their superior self-sufficiency-and thus their superior claim to 
rule-while circumventing the otherwise absurd effort to satisfy a limitless need. 
In fact, in revealing their superior character, the Spartan elite decisively improve 
on the example of the wrestlers; one's character is less needy because it is less 
vulnerable to the whims of nature and fortune. And because it is independent of 
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biology, one's character also appears to be more "one's own"; the self-
sufficiency they seek to reveal derives almost entirely from their own efforts. At 
any rate, the Greeks appear to provide a rational response to the conflict 
between the efforts to satisfy their seemingly endless needs and the limits, 
natural or otherwise, to all such efforts. 
Given its place at the beginning of Thucydides' discussion of Greekness, we 
should not be surprised to find such a political psychology at work in the 
wartime efforts of both the Athenians and the Spartans. At the least, those cases 
when Thucydides draws our attention to Olympic contestants should reinforce 
the lessons so subtly intimated in his narrative even as they invite us to bring our 
earlier insights to bear on the passages in question. 
Cylon 
Cylon is the first Olympic victor noted in the History (l.26). He was an 
Athenian noble who attempted to overthrow the city of Athens and establish 
himself as tyrant. Cylon based the date of his coup on the Delphic oracle's 
prophecy that he should seize Athens on the greatest festival day. And he 
presumed the greatest festival day to occur during the Olympic festivals since he 
was crowned Olympic champion during these holidays. Cylon thus appears 
fueled by the conviction of his superiority as revealed in his Olympic victory. 
And he appears to desire to dominate Athens openly to reveal his own greatness 
just as the Olympic wrestlers revealed themselves in part to disclose their 
natural superiority. 
But while consideration of Olympic nudity suggested the contestants 
understood their victory to reveal their attention to some rightful limit on their 
quest for victory, Cylon's story suggests that he wanted to rule Athens alone and 
without limit. He did not see, as the Spartan great saw, that to establish his true 
superiority he must establish his independence from the goods that come with 
ruling. Nor did he see that this is best effected through service to others. Had he 
reflected on what he hoped to win by the possession of a good like political rule, 
he might have seen that devotion to the common good and not tyranny best 
reveals one's superiority. 
To come to such an insight, Cylon would have had to reflect on those 
physical and psychological needs driving him to pursue tyranny. And such 
reflection would have forced him to accept the limits to his political hopes and 
thereby moderate his political aims. At least this is what the details of his story 
would suggest. For instance, Thucydides notes here that another religious 
festival was also considered the greatest - the Diasia, a festival celebrated 
outside the city. He also notes, as a seeming aside, that most of those who live 
outside the city are poor and that, on account of their poverty, the poor who 
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participate in the Diasia do so by sacrificing to the god animals fashioned out of 
cake (I.126.6). By distinguishing this festival of Zeus by the presence and 
participation of the poor, this seemingly minor detail's political relevance 
emerges much more clearly. Thucydides' apparent aside here invites us to 
contrast the example of the demos, whose poverty and neediness compel them at 
once to sacrifice and to moderate their sacrifices, with that of the wealthy 
nobleman Cylon, who seeks unlimited political power for himself. 
Because Cylon does not include the Diasia in his political calculations, he 
does not think of the poor, the bodily needs that plague them, and the pieties that 
moderate their sacrifices. And this failure mirrors his misinterpretation of the 
oracle. Insofar as he judges his Olympic victory to confirm his superior worth, 
and insofar as this judgment clouds his interpretation of the prophecy, Cylon 
fails to see that his superiority is best revealed through political moderation. 
Because his misinterpretation of the oracle allows him to forget what is nearest 
to his city, like the religious festival in Attica, then it appears that Cylon has not 
sufficiently reflected on what is nearest to him, like the neediness that drives 
him to pursue immoderate political rule. 
In light of his Olympic victory, Cylon's failure in Athens compels one to 
raise questions about the link between one's presumed natural superiority and 
the recognition by others of that quality: if he was manifestly superior to 
Athens' current rulers then how could he have failed? His failure forces us to 
ask whether the presumed good of political rule, with its public recognition of 
who is politically superior, satisfies what men like Cylon seek in disclosing their 
greatness. After all, how can the public confirmation of his greatness testify to 
his superior self-sufficiency and thus superior goodness when he also depends 
so completely on the public's approbation? The following digression on 
Pausanias (I.128-135. l) and Themistocles (I.135.2-138), two men also charged 
with aspiring to tyranny, deepen these reflections. 
Alcibiades 
Of course, to see these reflections confirmed, we must tum to Thucydides' 
presentation of Alcibiades. After all, few Greeks in Thucydides' work represent 
Greek greatness like Alcibiades.5 Surely he, of all figures, represents the 
psychology of the Olympic champion. But Alcibiades did not participate in the 
Olympic games; he sponsored the chariots who were first, second and fourth 
victors at the Olympic games (VI.16). Such distance from the field of 
competition finds its parallel in his curious absence from the field of battle. 
Given his reckless political ambitions one is surprised to discover that we never 
witness Alcibiades engaged in armed conflict. He is always behind the action, 
trying to orchestrate the great political drama unfolding before him. This fact 
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reflects the amazing indirection characteristic of his policies as a whole (see for 
instance, Vl.48); his plans always rely on deceit, feints, and playing his 
opponents off of each other. Such indirectness of action, however, contrasts 
strikingly with the candor with which he asserts in speech both his right to rule 
his fellow Athenians (VI.16) and his pursuit of even loftier ambitions (Vl.89-
92). 
Alcibiades' apparent refusal to engage in direct conflict with others, 
however, does not stem from any reservations about his superior qualities as 
much as it stems from his profound belief that they are so manifestly great as to 
render any direct contest unnecessary. In this way, his character embodies a 
more rational stage in Olympic political psychology. For by reflecting on the 
questions occasioned by Cylon's failure, one must also raise questions about the 
very logic behind Olympic victors. If one's greatness is in fact as manifest as 
one supposes, then what explains the need to have it confirmed by others? To 
pursue such confirmation through physical contest is to admit tacitly that one's 
greatness is not as manifest as originally supposed. And a coerced confirmation 
is not nearly as sweet as one freely granted. Awareness of such points seems to 
explain Alcibiades' resort to persuasion as opposed to force. Through speech he 
can reveal his course of action to be the superior course, and through the rational 
disclosure of such superiority he can gain the voluntary compliance of his 
audience. 
Of course, to say that Alcibiades reflects a more rational development of 
Olympic political psychology is not to say that his perspective is simply 
rational. For if Alcibiades does not wish to compete openly for the public's 
recognition of his virtue, then his title to rule will always remain in question. On 
the other hand, if he does deign to test his worth openly-through force or 
speech-then he must admit that a question exists as to his manifest superiority. 
Alcibiades surely knows, for instance, that his political enemies, be they 
Athenians, Spartans or Persians, will not simply acquiesce to his political will. 
Their resistance alone should cause him to reflect on the divergent interests that 
define political life; it should lead him to reflect on the connection between 
one's presumed greatness, which should be its own reward, and the goods one 
believes to be owed on account of that presumption. 
These reflections emerge most clearly in Thucydides' lengthiest treatment of 
Olympic victors and Olympic games (V.49-50 and ff). Thucydides notes that 
during the games in the 12th year of the war the Boeotian-led chariot of the 
Spartan Lichas was declared victorious. So that all the Greeks would know he 
was responsible for the win, Lichas crowned his driver in the middle of the 
concourse. Because it had recently been declared unlawful for Spartans to 
attend, participate in or even sacrifice at the games, Lichas was publicly 
whipped. Unable to resist the desire to reveal his responsibility for the chariot's 
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victory, Lichas's actions implicitly testify that winning by itself (if on the sly) is 
not enough; he needs the Greek world to witness his superiority even though it 
might mean, oddly enough, risking the stain of impiety and public humiliation. 
Had he been content merely with the knowledge of his chariot's victory-that is, 
had he been more moderate in his expectations about what victory could mean 
for him-Lichas could have left the Olympic Games unscathed. His example 
suggests that understanding one's superior self-sufficiency as a good in itself is 
perfectly consistent with a prudence that requires us, at times, to practice a 
certain concealment. 
While Lichas, the Spartan sponsor of charioteers, suffers the shortcomings of 
his "Olympic" understanding, Alcibiades, his Athenian parallel, manages to 
avoid a similar fate. Always able to wiggle out of a jam, Alcibiades is never 
compelled by some political failure to ask how voluntarily limiting the pursuit 
of self interest can be at once the means to his good and the very good he 
pursues. Nor do we see him ask what is so sensible about concealing himself in 
the service of revealing his greatness. Were he to raise such questions, 
Alcibiades would also be led to wonder how the political rule he seeks can 
reveal and thereby establish his superiority if it is also and at the same time 
supposed to confirm a superiority that should already be manifest. Put 
differently, if one's greatness is understood in terms of self-sufficiency, then one 
cannot also claim, as Alcibiades does, to be entitled to extra goods on account of 
that greatness. At any rate, one might expect such questions, if asked, to 
introduce at least a temporary pause in one's pursuit of political rule, a pause we 
see nowhere in Alcibiades' frenzied career. 
By helping us raise these questions, however, Thucydides illustrates for the 
reader the incoherence of the Olympic perspective. Through the figure of 
Alcibiades we see how the Greek response to one's physical and psychological 
neediness-which originally gave birth to the concern for the common good and 
. ,, the discovery of justice-can lead to the subordination of the common good to 
individual self-interest, and thus to injustice. After all, Alcibiades, perhaps the 
fullest flowering of the Greek ideal, also represents the work's greatest traitor. 
By arranging political events to highlight his own greatness, Alcibiades earned a 
most infamous reputation as a double-dealer. Alcibiades' promise and apparent 
betrayal allow us to see more clearly how a war whose greatness consists in the 
suffering, lawlessness and injustice it wrought, could arise among the Greeks, 
who were the very cradle of justice and politics itself. In so indicating the single 
root of justice and injustice, Thucydides prepares us to wonder if justice, as it 
emerges in ancient Greece, possesses an unblemished integrity. Or is it 
inextricably linked to the injustice it opposes? 
""" 
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Arcadia 
Faced with such questions, we are led to wonder if there exists a more 
adequate response to those needs that led to the Greek discovery of politics. 
Again, Thucydides' most extended treatment of Olympic victors and Olympic 
Games (V.49-50) proves crucial to this quest. Thucydides identifies these games 
not by the impiety of Lichas, but by the victory of Androsthenes of Arcadia. 
Because this is the only reference to Androsthenes in his massive work, 
Thucydides' note here focuses our attention on his Arcadian background. Given 
the brevity of our task, we can only speculate about the importance of such a 
tiny region to Thucydides' broader purposes. Two observations here will 
suffice: Arcadia is mentioned along with Athens as the only regions in Greece 
whose soil lacked natural virtue (I.2) and it is ultimately responsible for giving 
Sicily its name (V.2). 
As one commentator notes6, Thucydides' introduction to Athens suggests 
that her natural poverty proved critical to the emergence of her political talent 
and, ultimately, her imperial power. Thucydides' artistry thus presents Arcadia 
as an alternative to Athens, one whose response to her own neediness and 
vulnerability did not lead to conquest and empire, but rather to the emergence of 
an island power that would deal Athens its greatest defeat. Of course, given her 
location in the heart of the Peloponnese, Arcadia could never develop that stable 
population which proved so important to the growth of Athenian power. But 
even the great island-power Sicily, like Arcadia herself, never sought dominion 
over others. Rather, she defended herself against the unprovoked aggression of 
an imperialist Athens. Moreover, unlike every other Olympic victor noted in the 
History7, Androsthenes, the Arcadian champion of the Pancration, never sought 
to translate his Olympic victory into political domination; apparently he did not 
understand his victory to entitle him to additional goods. Might it not be the case 
then that Thucydides intends to present Arcadia and Arcadians as reflecting an 
alternative response to those needs that led Athens, Cylon, and Alcibiades to 
seek the full disclosure of their greatness through political domination? Might 
Arcadia's example suggest that a more moderate understanding of natural 
greatness, borne from a profound initiation into human need and thus human 
limits, can be consistent with policies of restraint and concealment? 
Such suggestions, though tempting, must also account for the fact that 
Arcadia herself was always subject to invasion by others and that her political 
heirs, the Sicilians responsible for naming their island, were eventually 
supplanted by the Syracusans. And the best examples of political moderation 
and prosperity in the work, Sicily, Chios and Sparta, owe such benefits to their 
outward domination of others. In fact, the History as a whole clearly shows that 
cities cannot practice such restraint and concealment if they hope to thrive and 
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remain free. But perhaps individuals can practice a restraint and concealment 
that is nevertheless consistent with their natural greatness. While men like 
Cylon, Alcibiades and Lichas do not practice such restraint or concealment, 
another notable political "failure" does. Could Thucydides embody the solution 
to the problems confronting Olympic victors? 
Thucydides' Love of Victory 
While no Olympic champion, Thucydides informs us that he too seeks 
victory in his contest with the poets (1. 9-11; 19-22). The character of the victory 
he seeks best comes to light by reflecting on his famous methodological 
comments near the beginning of Book I (22). Thucydides' particular method is 
crucial insofar as it is his distinctive approach to political affairs that constitutes 
his superiority over the poets. These comments insist on two strict distinctions: 
1.) between the speeches and deeds of the History's actors and 2.) between 
Thucydides' judgment and historical accuracy. A concern with historical 
accuracy governed his treatment of the deeds, while he composed the speeches 
with a view to what was, in his judgment, necessary under the given 
circumstances. 
This is a notoriously difficult passage, so we shall limit ourselves to a few 
simple observations. 8 First, as reflection on the History shows, the speeches and 
deeds of the History's actors are not as distinct as Thucydides insists. After all, 
aren't delivered speeches themselves deeds? And the line between his concern 
with historical accuracy and his own view of what was necessary also tends to 
blur. Again, didn't Thucydides select and arrange which episodes and speeches 
he judged necessary to report? 
Were it not for his artistry, we might be inclined to attribute such apparent 
inconsistencies to Thucydides' carelessness. But if Thucydides is in control of 
his work, as he surely is, we must ask why he invites his reader to cast doubt on 
the adequacy of his methods through the very manner in which he presents 
them. If he wants to point out the insufficiency of strict distinctions between 
speech and deed or between historical accuracy and his own judgment, then why 
not just say so? 
One of the virtues of proceeding so indirectly is that by insisting on the 
explicit distinctions between speech and deed and between his treatment of 
speeches and deeds, even as he acts to the contrary, Thucydides can bring to 
light the character of such distinctions in a manner that is faithful to their 
absence. And if Thucydides' speech does in fact eschew the strict distinction 
drawn between the speeches and deeds of the History's actors, then he can 
hardly be expected to draw the distinction between his speech and the speeches 
and deeds of the war so distinctly. To do so would be to commit the very fallacy 
' 
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he seeks to correct. He can thus quietly indicate the character of his own 
"speech" even as he "speaks" openly of the speeches and deeds of the History's 
actors. But such observations should unsettle us since they leave us with the 
impression that Thucydides practices an almost unheard of indirection in his 
presentation of political life. In this way, he reminds us ofDiodotus who, in his 
speech on the fate of the Mytileneans, informs his fellow Athenians of the need 
to lie to them (III.43). 
The necessity and political relevance of such concealment emerge when we 
recall Thucydides' treatment of the Greek love of victory. In detailing the roots 
in human nature of the desire for self-disclosure, Thucydides sketched the single 
origin of both justice and injustice. By subtly indicating that the justice which 
defines Greek political life also issues in or requires injustice, he pointed us to 
the obstacles confronting our ability to realize (and thus to know) a universal, 
unified, and unblemished moral category like a "justice as such." Thucydides' 
treatment of speeches and deeds reflects this insight insofar as that treatment's 
blurring of the distinction between speeches and deeds suggests that universal 
categories-which can only exist in the realm of pure speech-cannot exist apart 
from the particulars that constitute them. By pointing to the necessity of 
particulars for understanding universal categories, Thucydides' speech, 
informed by his insight into Greek politics, discloses a limit to our ability to 
know universals simply.9 
It would seem then that in his recognition and observance of such limits lies 
Thucydides' victory over the poets. As his presentation of his great rival 
suggests, Homer seeks the applause of his audience (III.104). In fact, Homer, 
just like any other athlete, participated in the musical contests of the Delian 
games, seeking the public praise of his poetry. In seeking victory at Delos, 
Homer seeks the recognition of his greatness and thus the external confirmation 
of his superior nature. He thus appears to share the political perspective of the 
Olympic victors. Moreover, his desire for such praise implies that he has not 
seen the problems with the view that Thucydides brings to light for us. And 
because his poetry serves such goals (see again III. I 04), one should not be 
surprised to discover that it suffers from the same problems facing those athletes 
and statesmen who see in their victories more than there is. Thus, one of 
Thucydides' first criticisms of Homeric poetry was that it exaggerated the war's 
greatness; like the Olympic champions, Homer saw in the Trojan War more than 
there really was. 
In light of this, it would appear that the poets overlook the moral and 
political shortcomings that Thucydides grasps. Perhaps then they also fail to 
appreciate the limitations to reason that are their consequence. Thucydides 
triumphs over the poets because his work reveals the truth about human limits 
while still obeying such limits. And while the observance of such limits 
l 
' 
Socrates: Reason or Unreason as the Foundation of European Identity I 09 
discloses his greatness to us, as it did with the Spartan wrestlers and political 
elite, he does not require us to confirm that greatness for him. He wrote his work 
for neither applause nor prizes, but to be permanently useful (1.22). Of course, 
the lessons drawn out from Thucydides' presentation of Greek politics need not 
merely apply to his backwards glance at the poets. They might also serve as a 
preemptive criticism of those who follow Thucydides' efforts to present the 
enduring truth about human affairs. They suggest that Thucydides anticipated 
the difficulties that could beset the more direct dialectical inquiry employed by 
Socrates in the Platonic and Xenophontic dialogues. And these theoretical 
insights return us to the contemporary relevance of Thucydides. 
Thucydides and Europe 
According to Pierre Manent 10, the movement towards greater European 
unification is fueled by the belief that effectively erasing national borders within 
Europe will do away with the preconditions for warfare; no national boundaries 
means nothing to fight over. Europeans can cease worrying that they might 
someday revisit the horrors of the last century. This hope that that they can do 
away with war on the continent also stems from the view that war is little more 
than violent commerce. Given the sophisticated nature of modern free-market 
economies, we can peacefully address the commercial needs of men and nations 
and consider war a barbaric relic of a bygone age. A true union of European 
states represents the promise of a political good common to all Europeans by 
making national borders politically insignificant and enhancing Europe's 
economic standing in the world. 
Thucydides' History, however, shows modern Europeans to be wrong on 
both counts. At the heart of the Greek love of victory, and thus conquest and 
war, is not the desire for commercial gain, but rather the full revelation of one's 
natural greatness. More importantly, he shows that the desire to reveal one's 
greatness finds its fullest and most consistent realization not in tyranny but in 
service to the common good. And this means one needs a vision of the common 
good that can arouse one's manly desire to assert his greatness on its behalf. But 
in the effort to abandon the politics of grandeur, modern Europeans obstruct any 
effort to articulate or even think about goods that are common to all; afraid of 
endorsing the exclusive goods they want to transcend, they shrink from putting 
goods "in common." They thus enervate those hidden springs within man that 
generate grand political action. And without any robust notion of the common 
good, one cannot hope individuals will simply restrain on their own the selfish 
pursuit of their ambitions. Nor can one reliably expect others to resist the efforts 
of their most talented and ambitious citizens. The tyranny they fear thus 
becomes more, not less, likely. 
110 Chapter Seven 
Of course, Thucydides' account of Greek politics also points to the tenuous 
nature of the justice that defines it. By pointing to the close link between justice 
and injustice, he points to the futility of all utopian schemes dedicated to 
realizing a good that is unambiguously common to all. His dramatic illustration 
of Olympic political psychology should thus temper the European propensity, 
cultivated by its century long experience with ideology, to seek political 
solutions embracing all of humanity. But more than this, the History offers a 
powerful, if quiet, warning for European political scientists. It suggests that the 
very effort to instantiate a community such as the E.U. clouds their capacity for 
genuine political reflection and self-examination. As Thucydides' methods 
suggested, one could only reliably gain access to "universal" political wisdom 
through reflection on the particulars that constitute political categories. But by 
trying to transcend particular national distinctions, contemporary Europeans 
undermine the very conditions required for the study of politics. Their utopian 
vision blinds them to the limits of reason, leaving them politically shortsighted 
and incapable of bearing witness to Thucydides' greatness. In presenting the life 
and death of Greek politics as he does, Thucydides reminds those concerned 
with Europe's apolitical drift of the humane necessity of politics while 
highlighting the fragility of Europe's most precious inheritance. 
Notes 
1 Thucydides' work has no official title. I follow the convention of referring to it as the 
History. References to the History are in the standard book, chapter and section form. All 
translations of Thucydides' Greek are my own. 
2 Pierre Manent's A World beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation State (Princeton 
University Press: 2006), chapter 7. 
3 For parallel readings of this section see Steve Forde's The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades 
and the Politics of Imperialism in Thucydides (Cornell University Press: 1989), 48 and 
175; Clifford Orwin's The Humanity of Thucydides (Princeton: 1994), 31; and Paul 
Ludwig's Eros and Polis (Cambridge University Press: 2002), especially 153-169 and 
262-318. 
4 Simon Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume I. Books I-III (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), 26-7. 
5 Chapter 2 ofForde's Ambition proved a major source of inspiration for this section. 
6 See chapter 3 of Forde's Ambition. , 
7 The only other time Thucydides identifies an Olympiad by one of its champions is at 
Ill.9, where he introduces the Mytileneans's speech to the Spartans by referring to 
Dorieus of Rhodes. To see the import of such a reference, compare Thucydides' later 
reference to Dorieus (VJIJ.34) with the Mytilenean speech here. 
8 There is perhaps no finer introduction to the subtleties of this passage than Clifford 
Orwin's "Thucydides' Contest," Review of Politics 51 (1989): 345-364. 
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9 Such a limit does not undermine the possibility of knowing the enduring truth about 
human affairs. Thucydides himself makes his work's insights contingent on the 
constancy of human nature (1.22). 
'
0 See again chapter 7 ofManent'sA World beyond Politics?. 
